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Following the programme of market reforms initiated in the late 1970s by Deng 
Xiaoping, the economy of China has grown at an unprecedented pace and scale. As 
a result of this extraordinary process, China has become the second-largest economy 
in the world, and is now playing an increasingly influential role in the global economic 
order. This ambitious economic expansion has contextually boosted the country’s 
military ambitions. Thus, after several years of double-digit defence spending 
increases, China is today the world’s second-highest military spender. Perhaps not 
surprisingly, Beijing’s economic and military transformation has become the epicenter 
of a passionate discussion among Western, and especially American, commentators, 
contributing to make the rise of China a prominent issue in international relations (IR) 
scholarship. Will China disrupt the status quo and challenge the extant ruling power, 
namely the USA? In doing so, will it adopt an increasingly belligerent attitude? 
 
Many different, and often conflicting, answers have been given to these questions. 
Liegl’s book seeks to contribute to this important debate by examining four past cases 
of China’s use of force in foreign affairs, namely the intervention in Korea in the early 
1950s (Chapter 3), the conflict with India in 1962 (Chapter 4), the border clashes with 
the Soviet Union in 1969 (Chapter 5) and the offensive launched against Vietnam in 
1979 (Chapter 6). The book draws on insights from Lebow’s cultural theory of IR, 
which, contrary to traditional IR theories, promotes a more comprehensive 
understanding of the role of non-material elements such as honour, standing and 
status in international politics (Chapter 2). Liegl’s first set of findings fully comply with 
Lebow’s model. Specifically, the author concludes that in none of the four empirical 
cases studied in the book did China go to war to protect national interests or make 
territorial gains; instead, the motives behind the decision to use force were primarily 
non-material. According to Liegl, China intervened in Korea to increase its 
international status; it used military force against India because of the latter’s refusal 
to take its powerful neighbour seriously; it engaged in armed clashes with the Soviet 
Union in response to a perceived attempt at intimidation; and, finally, it launched an 
offensive against Vietnam as a form of punishment for the latter’s provocative and 
disrespectful attitudes. 
 
The question as to what factor more than others influences a particular course of 
action is ultimately one of interpretation. In the instant cases, while the author develops 
his arguments in a sophisticated and methodologically sound manner, it is the present 
reviewer’s view that China’s fears of being encircled and threatened constitute 
important explanatory variables that, particularly in light of the historical circumstances 
of the time, contribute to blur the line between ‘offensive’ and ‘defensive’ actions. This 
is particularly evident in the case of the intervention in Korea, where more nuanced 
explanations of the relevant motives at play may be warranted in light of the serious 
threat posed by the advance of foreign forces to the Yalu River. While beyond the 
book’s scope, it is also interesting to note that these four instances of use of force 
raise a number of important questions in terms of international law, a circumstance 
which could further add to the complexity of interpreting and assessing each situation. 
For example, while the Chinese intervention against India did exhibit punitive attitudes, 
a legal evaluation of the said conduct would also need to take into account the fact 
that, as the author suggests, New Delhi’s ‘forward policy’ challenged the territorial 
integrity of China, notably a prohibited action which carries important legal 
consequences under international law. 
 
What matters most, however, is how the book reflects, departing from the above 
findings, on contemporary problems. In addressing this central question, Liegl 
suggests that China’s historical inclination to use force for non-material motives should 
today be taken into serious account by policymakers in Washington and East Asia 
because ‘status-seeking’ and ‘status-preservation’ are still defining elements of 
Chinese foreign policy. Hence, he warns, it might be again issues of honour, standing 
and status that will primarily determine China’s reactions to situations of crisis and 
conflicts, with obvious consequences for both the actors involved and the international 
community. Considering the tensions that have recently erupted in the East China Sea 
and South China Sea, the book’s overall purpose is very timely. While looking at 
present day China, however, the book does not directly engage with a potentially 
important question, namely the relevance of the broader context in determining a State 
behaviour in IR. In light of the current connectivity and interdependence between 
China and the international system, should one not expect the former to behave in a 
less ‘emotional’ way than it did more than 50 years ago? After all, when it intervened 
in Korea or used force against India, the Soviet Union and Vietnam, China was 
economically weak and politically isolated. Today, by contrast, China is not only an 
economic giant but is also deeply integrated into international institutions. This 
extraordinary transformation has reshaped China’s identity and arguably redefined not 
only its interests but also its emotions. Since China fully operates within the 
international system, and hugely benefits from it, any action that could threaten the 
latter’s fundamental rules and principles would have different consequences than in 
the past. Against this background, Liegl is right in suggesting that ‘status ambitions’ 
will continue to affect China’s international behaviour (a circumstance which should be 
taken into account when interacting with Beijing), but, crucially, new important factors 
and dynamics will be instrumental in determining it. This is something that, according 
to the present reviewer, should be borne in mind when drawing any parallel between 
the China of today and China more than 50 years ago. 
 
In conclusion, Liegl’s work has the combined merit of expanding scholarly debates on 
the role of ‘emotions’ in IR and providing a sophisticated explanation for the role of 
status and standing in Chinese foreign policy. The timely topic and the author’s 
rigorous analyses further contribute to make the book particularly appealing to any 
scholar interested in exploring and understanding the various geopolitical implications 
of China’s rise in the current world. 
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